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Over the centuries, creditors have had many things to fear, in-
cluding inflation, bankruptcy, military conflict, ayatollahs, and pes-
tilence. Of all of the problems that have caused nightmares for
creditors, arguably the most frightening is lender liability.' This is
because previous attacks on the assets of creditors (i.e. the debt of
their debtors) at worst would have resulted in the loss of the debt.
Utilizing the theory of lender liability, parties have successfully
sued creditors for amounts well in excess of the loan.2 Recent envi-
ronmental cases and statutes utilizing lender liability theories have
added to the sleepless nights faced by many creditors.3 Creditors
now are confronting not only the loss of their asset, but also the
responsibility for paying hundreds of thousands of dollars, or more,
to clean up hazardous waste dump sites." Ironically, secured credi-
* Mr. Burcat and Ms. Shorey are associated with the law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lock-
hart, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those
of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart or its clients.
1. The term "lender liability" applies equally to all creditors, including lenders, mort-
gagees, parties that have extended credit, judgment creditors, and factors.
2. See, e.g. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)($13.5 million
judgment awarded against creditor). For an excellent survey of the topic of lender liability,
see Note, The Doctrine of Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1988).
3. See statutes and cases as developed in this article.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986)(summary judgment granted in favor of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
against bank-defendant for EPA's costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site contaminated
by mortgagor, where EPA had spent $551,713 to clean up hazardous wastes from mortgaged
414 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 28:413
tors, who always expected special protection and consideration re-
gardless of the financial condition of their debtors, now find them-
selves facing scrutiny from state and federal environmental
regulators, other creditors, and neighbors of environmental disaster
sites.'
On the national scene, federal courts have failed to examine the
traditional grounds for lender liability in analyzing environmental
lender liability cases.' Partly, this is a result of inadequate guid-
ance from Congress.7 Although the federal cases have focused on
the relatively narrow theory of lender liability under hazardous
waste laws, nothing in the federal statutes limits suits against cred-
itors under any other federal environmental law.8 The states, like-
wise, have enacted environmental legislation that contains traps
for unwary creditors and this legislation is worthy of reexamina-
tion by creditors and their counsel.'
Pennsylvania, a perennial leader in the field of environmental
law and protection of the environment, has laws that bear directly
on the value of debts to creditors. Some of the Pennsylvania envi-
ronmental laws have been on the books for many years. Other laws
are relatively new. The older laws have been copied by other states
and the federal government when enacting new environmental leg-
premises).
5. See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665
(W.D. Pa. 1989) (bank-creditor sued by neighbor of hazardous waste disposal site).
6. See cases as developed in this article. The federal courts see the Federal Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1982 & Supp. 1986) (CERCLA) as mandating the development of federal common law,
rather than the application of the law of any particular state, when determining who may be
liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs associated with a hazardous waste site. See United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989). The Kaiser-Roth case dealt with
the factors to be considered in determining whether a parent corporation could be held
responsible for the activities of its subsidiary at a hazardous waste site. Six different theo-
ries of liability were offered by the plaintiff. The court found the parent could be held liable
under two-"parent as operator" and "piercing the corporate veil"-and did not address the
other four proposed theories. Of interest is the court's analysis of the parent as operator,
which focused on the control the parent asserted over the activities of the subsidiary. Id. at
22-23.
7. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1988)("It is not surprising that, as a hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legisla-
tion, CERCLA failed to address many important issues.. . . The meager legislative history
available indicates that Congress expected the courts to develop a federal common law to
supplement the statute.")
8. See Gieser, Federal and State Environmental Law: A Trap for the Unwary
Lender, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 643.
9. See Gieser, supra note 8.
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islation. 10 Pennsylvania's newer laws are modelled on existing fed-
eral laws.11 In several cases, the Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources (DER) has gone beyond seeking liability
merely under the hazardous waste laws. In bankruptcy and admin-
istrative proceedings DER has suggested the extension of lender
liability to mining12 and oil and gas cases. 3 As Pennsylvania's ad-
ministrative agencies and courts interpret these laws, lenders will
feel a significant impact on how they conduct business in the Com-
monwealth. Other states and the federal courts will, no doubt, take
notice of the decisions that are focusing on Pennsylvania. This ar-
ticle examines and discusses the various Pennsylvania environmen-
tal statutes and cases interpreting those statutes under which cred-
itors may be held liable for environmental harm caused by their
debtors.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY OF CREDITORS
The genesis of the theory of environmental liability of creditors
began in 1980 with the enactment of the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA or Superfund)." The uninitiated reader may not be aware
that the theory of environmental liability of creditors was not suc-
cessfully asserted or reported until after the enactment of CER-
CLA."5 The theory of environmental lender liability springs from
10. The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 -
1328 (1982) is based, in part, on an early version of the Pennsylvania Surface Mining Con-
servation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 §§ 1396.1 - 1396.31 (Purdon Supp.
1989).
11. The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§ 6020.101
- 6020.1305 (Purdon Supp. 1989) is based on the federal Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (1982).
12. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. S. E. Barnhart & Sons, 664 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1981).
13. Pennbank v. DER, No. 88-281-M (Pa. EHB Feb 15, 1989), 1989 Pa. Envirn.
LEXIS 39.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. 1986). As a number of commentators have
already addressed in detail the general issue of liability of creditors under federal environ-
mental laws, this article will summarize the basis of the theory of liability, but will not
describe in detail matters that have been addressed more fully elsewhere. See Comment,
Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Under Section 101 (20)A of CERCLA, 98
YALE L.J. 925 (1989); Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA,, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 139; Gieser, supra note 8; Bur-
cat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors and other
Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 (1986).
15. See Burcat, supra note 14, at 509. The first case that discussed environmental




judicial interpretations of CERCLA.
CERCLA establishes four categories of persons, known as "re-
sponsible persons," who may be held responsible for paying the
cost of cleaning up environmentally contaminated sites. 6 These
categories include the current owners and operators of an environ-
mentally contaminated facility, the owners and operators of such a
facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances, generators
of hazardous waste materials disposed at the facility, and persons
who transported hazardous waste materials to the facility.' Under
CERCLA, the government or a private party is permitted to re-
cover from responsible persons certain costs incurred in responding
to releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances from
facilities. 18
CERCLA did not single out creditors for special liability. In fact,
creditors were granted a special exception from liability, known as
the "security interest exemption."' 9 This exemption excludes cer-
tain secured creditors from the definition of "owner" or "operator"
under CERCLA. Ironically, the security interest exemption sug-
gested to the courts and some litigants that creditors could be held
liable for environmental damages caused by their debtors. Subse-
quent court decisions have solidified the theory of environmental
liability of creditors.20
Separate from the exemption for secured creditors, CERCLA
also contains three separate statutory defenses to liability.2 These
provisions provide responsible parties with statutory defenses from
liability for acts of God, acts of war, and the acts of third parties
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a) (1982). The security interest exemption states:
"Owner or operator" means... (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility. . . .Such term does not include
a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel orfacility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility.
Id. (Emphasis added).
20. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (W.D.
Pa. 1989); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Coastal Casting
Serv., Inc. v. Aron, No. H-86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988); United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). See Polger v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 709 F. Supp. 204 (D. Col. 1989)
(bank's motion to dismiss CERCLA claim granted in part, no reference made to security
interest exemption).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
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(the "third party defense"). These defenses were relied on infre-
quently during the early years of the act.s2
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA when it enacted the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA). 23 SARA did not change the language of the security inter-
est exemption, but it did add additional, and very stringent, re-
quirements for making out the so-called "third party defense" to
liability.24 To obtain the benefit of this defense, the claimant is
required to prove that the contamination was caused by a third
party who did not have a "contractual relationship" with the
claimant, that the claimant exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substances, and that the claimant took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party. 5 Since the
enactment of SARA to prove a lack of a contractual relationship,
the claimant must establish that if the contamination occurred
before he owned the property, he did not know and had no reason
to know of the contamination at the time he acquired the facility.26
Proof that the claimant had no knowledge of the contamination
includes evidence of an "appropriate inquiry, 2 7 which may include
an environmental audit.2 8 From a public policy perspective, the en-
22. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985)(third
party defense dismissed by court).
23. Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) and 9607(b) (1982). See Marcus, The Price of Innocence:
Landowner Liability Under CERCLA and SARA, 6 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 117 (1987).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1986). An individual claimant may be entitled to
the defense if he can establish that he acquired the facility by inheritance. A governmental
claimant may escape liability if it establishes that it acquired the facility through escheat,
involuntary transfer, or eminent domain. Id.
27. The full text of the CERCLA provision requiring an appropriate inquiry takes into
consideration the relative level of sophistication of the claimant:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i) of
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the time
of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to mini-
mize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into ac-
count any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the rela-
tionship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the ob-
viousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1986).
28. Environmental audits are the best way to protect against unforeseen liability. Such
audits, however, are expensive and not infallible. See BCW Assoc., Ltd. v. Occidental Chem.
Corp., No. 86-5947, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11275, 75 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1988)(plaintiff and
former owners not entitled to assert third party defense even though two environmental
Duquesne Law Review
actment of SARA reemphasized the intent of Congress to transfer
the cost of cleaning up hazardous waste sites from the public to the
private sector of the economy. 9
Four cases are of especial significance to an understanding of the
environmental liability of creditors: United States v. Mirabile;30
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.;31 United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp.;32 and Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg.
Co.
33
United States v. Mirabile34 was the first case to directly address
the issue of environmental lender liability. In Mirabile, three lend-
ers were joined as third party defendants by the original defendant
in a CERCLA cost recovery action. One lender had foreclosed on a
mortgage it held on the site without taking title and, four months
later, transferred its interest in the property to a third party, it
also had taken minimal action to protect the site from deprecia-
tion. The second lender had a second position security interest in
the real and personal property of the owner but took no action at
the site other than to visit the site to monitor liquidation of assets.
The third lender, who held a first position security interest in the
personal property of the owner, became involved in the manage-
ment of the owner to assist the owner in working out the debt and
in paying off the loan. 35 The court granted motions for summary
judgment made by the first two lenders but not that of the third
audits had been conducted that failed to show the presence of hazardous lead). Creditors,
purchasers of real estate and lessors may find added protection through the use of indemni-
fication agreements, representations and warranties contained in loan documents, agree-
ments to allocate costs of cleanup, escrowing of funds, and other means. See Davidson, En-
vironmental Considerations in Loan Documentation, 106 BANKING L.J. 308 (1989); Burcat,
Environmental Liability of Creditors under Superfund (with Forms), 33 PRAC. LAW., Mar.
1987, at 13, 19-23.
29. Commentators disagree on whether Congress intended to hold liable under CER-
CLA mortgagees that foreclose on contaminated sites. See Note, Interpreting the Meaning
of Lender Management Participation Under Section 101(20) (A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J.
925, 926 (1989)(Congress intended that mortgagees that foreclosed on real property would
be liable); Tupi, Guidice v. BFG Electroplating: Expanded CERCLA Liability for Foreclos-
ing Lenders, 4 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 844, 848 (1989)(Congress intended that mortgagees
that foreclosed on real property would not be liable). At least one commentator has argued
that "SARA cripples the foreclosure process." Comment, SARA Slams the Door: The Effect
of Superfund Amendments on Foreclosing Mortgagees, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 223, 239 (1987).
30. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
31. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986).
32. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.Ga. 1988).
33. 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
34. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
35. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996-97.
418 Vol. 28:413
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lender.3 6 The Mirabile court never examined the well established
body of lender liability law, but based its ruling on its interpreta-
tion of CERCLA. The court ruled that "prudent and routine steps
to secure the property against further depreciation" did not war-
rant the imposition of liability.3 7 To be found liable, a secured
creditor "must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day opera-
tional aspects of the site." 8
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,39 the court
granted a motion for summary judgment against a bank defendant
that was the secured creditor of an individual who had created a
hazardous waste site. The creditor had foreclosed on the mortgage
and taken title to the property in response to its debtor's failure to
pay the underlying debt. The court reasoned that the security in-
terest exemption protected only those parties holding security in-
terests and nothing more.'" Once the bank foreclosed and took ti-
tle, it lost both its security interest and its protection."'
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,42 the creditor defendant
had taken a security interest in equipment, fixtures and inventory
and a mortgage on the facility. The creditor had executed on a
judgment against the personalty. 43 The facility was later discov-
ered to contain hundreds of drums of hazardous wastes. The court
held that the creditor's activities, prior to the time it took posses-
sion of the property to conduct an auction of the collateral, did not
give rise to a cause of action under CERCLA." During the six
36. Id. The court specifically ruled that the following activities of the lenders did not
expose the creditors to CERCLA liability: protecting the subject property from vandalism
by boarding up windows and changing locks; making inquiries as to the cost of removal of
drums of hazardous wastes located on the property; having a loan officer visit the property
on several occasions to show the property to prospective purchasers; visiting the property to
monitor the liquidation of assets; monitoring cash collateral accounts, ensuring that receiv-
ables went to the proper account; and establishing a reporting system between the debtor
and the bank. Id. at 20996-97. The court also ruled that a bank that foreclosed on a mort-
gage, purchased the property at a sheriff's sale, and then transferred its right to the title
before accepting the deed, was not liable as an owner under CERCLA. Id. at 20996.
37. Id.
38. Id. This holding has been followed by the court in United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,
712 F. Supp. at 1204-05.
39. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
40. 632 F. Supp at 579. Some controversy exists regarding the court's interpretation of
the extent of the security interest exemption. See Burcat, supra note 14, at 522-23.
41. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. has been followed by the court in Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1670-71.
42. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
43. The creditor never foreclosed on the real property. 724 F. Supp. at 957.
44. Id. at 959-60. The pre-auction activities included holding the security interests in
the real and personal property, consultations with the debtor, financing the debtor, collect-
1990 419
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months that the creditor's representatives occupied the facility to
conduct the auction and to remove the remaining collateral, how-
ever, the court ruled that the creditor may have conducted activi-
ties giving rise to CERCLA liability. The court denied the credi-
tor's motion for summary judgment. "5 In determining whether the
creditor could rely on the security interest exemption, the court
followed the Mirabile reasoning on control of a facility:
I interpret the phrases "participating in the management of a . . .facility"
and "primarily to protect his security interest," to permit secured creditors
to provide financial assistance and general, and even isolated instances of
specific, management advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA liabil-
ity if the secured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the business or facility either before or after the business ceases
operation."'
The most recent of the significant environmental lender liability
cases is Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co.47 In Guidice, a
bank, over an 11 year period, made loans to an industrial enter-
prise and obtained security interests in the company's real and
personal property. When the debtor failed to pay on the loan, the
bank confessed judgment on the loans and later foreclosed on the
mortgage. The bank bid on the property at the sheriff's sale and
subsequently accepted a sheriff's deed. It held title to the property
for eight months before conveying the property to a trustee. While
the bank owned the property, its tenant may have allowed hazard-
ous substances to leak into the ground or drain onto an adjacent
alley. "' Several years later, the bank was joined as a third party
defendant to a personal injury action relating to an adjacent prop-
erty as a result of its prior involvement with the mortgaged prem-
ises. In ruling on the bank's motion for summary judgment, the
court held that the bank's pre-foreclosure activities did not
amount to control of the facility but "were prudent measures un-
dertaken to protect its security interest in the property.' 9 As to
ing on accounts receivable that had been assigned by the debtor, and checking the credit of
the debtor's customers. Id.
45. Id. The creditor's representatives, or buyers of the collateral, may have moved
drums of hazardous wastes from one part of the facility to another and may have knocked
loose asbestos from coated pipes. In addition, the creditor's representative was required to
leave the facility in a "broom clean" condition. Id. at 958.
46. Id. at 960 (emphasis in original).
47. 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
48. Id. at 1671.
49. Id. at 1669. The acceptable activities included holding a mortgage and other secur-
ity interests, receiving periodic financial statements, meeting with officials of the debtor,
actively assisting the debtor to obtain an SBA loan, communicating with DER and the local
Vol. 28:413
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the time period after foreclosure, the court examined the impact of
the SARA amendments and concluded that Congress did not in-
tend to "create a special class of otherwise liable landowners."5
"When a lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale,
the lender should be liable to the same extent as any other bidder
at the sale would have been. ' 51 The bank was held to be liable
under CERCLA for any releases of hazardous substances that oc-
curred during its nine month ownership of the property.
It is worth noting that none of the environmental lender liability
cases have examined the well established law of lender liability.
52
In particular, the courts have failed to utilize this existing body of
law to determine whether the creditor has involved itself to such
an extent as to be liable as an owner or operator. For example,
while generally, creditors are not liable for the debts of their debt-
ors, under certain circumstances a creditor may be liable for his
debtor's debts and obligations. Creditors have been held liable for
exerting excessive control over their debtors. 3 Under the alter ego
or instrumentality theory a creditor may be liable for all of the
debtor's obligations. 4 Creditors have also been found liable for
breach of contract and breach of good faith.55 These lender liabil-
ity theories have emerged as an outgrowth of common law tort,
contract and agency principles. Nevertheless, nothing in CERCLA
or SARA indicates any intent on the part of Congress to abrogate
or even limit this body of law.
5 6
All of the federal cases on environmental lender liability have
dealt with liability under CERCLA. There is no restriction, how-
municipality regarding wastewater discharge compliance and discussing with company offi-
cials the status of its accounts, personnel changes and the presence of raw materials. The
bank also had a representative visit the property and make a report and referred a potential
lessee to the owner of the facility. Id.
50. Id. at 1671. In criticizing this decision, one commentator has noted that "[i]n as-
serting the secured creditors exemption to avoid CERCLA liability, a foreclosing lender is
not asking the court to 'create a special class' for its benefit; Congress has already done so."
Tupi, supra note 29, at 846.
51. Guidice, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1671.
52. See Chaitman, The Ten Commandments for Avoiding Lender Liability, 22
U.C.C.L.J. 3 (1989); Note, supra note 2; Burcat, supra note 14, at 524-531. Creditors would
be well advised to examine the traditional grounds for so-called "lender liability" when
making risky loans, foreclosing on potentially contaminated facilities, or litigating environ-
mental liability cases.
53. See Note, supra note 2, at 169-86.
54. Id. at 186-89.
55. Id. at 189-200.
56. It is up to counsel for creditors facing environmental liability claims to reassert
this well established body of law as a defense to a CERCLA claim.
1990
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ever, on the application of this theory of liability under other envi-
ronmental laws. 7 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources (DER) has suggested the extension of this theory in
cases involving The Clean Streams Law,58 the Surface Mining Con-
servation and Reclamation Act,59 and the Oil and Gas Act.60 Other
Pennsylvania laws likewise contain language that suggests poten-
tial pitfalls for creditors. With this background in mind, the vari-
ous significant environmental laws of Pennsylvania will be
examined.
III. THE CLEAN STREAMS LAW
The Clean Streams Law61 was enacted in 1937." Section 3 of
The Clean Streams Law declared discharges of sewage and indus-
trial wastes into the "clean" waters of the Commonwealth to be
public nuisances. The Clean Streams Law established a permit sys-
tem whereby treated sewage and industrial wastes could be dis-
charged into waters"3 but exempted acid mine drainage and silt
from coal mines from its requirements until a "practical" means
for removing the "polluting properties" of these substances became
known." Amendments to The Clean Streams Law in 1945 added
restrictions on the discharge of acid mine drainage, prohibiting it
into "clean" waters, and prohibited the discharge of silt from coal
mines into any waters6 5 In 1965, the General Assembly, recogniz-
ing that The Clean Streams Law had not prevented an increase in
polluted waters in the Commonwealth, again amended the law,
providing for regulation of all discharges into any waters of the
57. See Gieser, supra note 8.
58. Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 -
691.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1989). See e.g. Western Pennsylvania Water Co. v. DER, 1988 Pa.
EHB 715, aff'd Pa. Commw. -, 560 A.2d 905 (1989).
59. Act of May 31, 1945, P.L. 1198, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-
1396.31.(Purdon Supp. 1989). See e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. S. E. Barnhart & Sons, 664
F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1981).
60. Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.58, §§
601.101-601.605 (Purdon Supp. 1989). See e.g, Pennbank v. DER, No. 88-281-M (Pa. EHB
Feb 15, 1989), 1989 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 39.
61. Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1-
691.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
62. For a brief description of the common law and predecessor legislation dealing with
water pollution, see R.T. Weston and J.R. Burcat, Legal Aspects of Pennsylvania Water
Management, in Water Resources in Pennsylvania: Availability, Quality and Management
219, 230-37 (S.K. Majumdar, E.W. Miller and R.R. Parizek eds. 1990).
63. Section 206, 207 and 306 of the Act of June 22, 1937.
64. Section 310 of the Act of June 22, 1937.
65. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act of May 8, 1945, P.L. 435.
Vol. 28:413
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Commonwealth. 6 Mine discharge was classified as industrial waste
and received no special treatment.6 7 A significant change made by
the General Assembly was the addition to The Clean Streams Law
of section 316, which required owners and occupiers of land to al-
low the Commonwealth to enter onto the land to remedy pollution
causing conditions.68 Current section 316 of The Clean Streams
Law,619 grants broad authority to DER, potentially including au-
thority to proceed against secured creditors.
Section 316 is entitled: "Responsibilities of landowners and land
occupiers. ' 70 The section gives DER the authority (1) to order the
landowner or occupier to correct a condition causing or having the
potential to cause pollution or (2) to correct the condition and re-
cover the cost by assessing a civil penalty against the landowner or
occupier. For the purposes of section 316, "landowner" is defined
as "any person holding title to or having a proprietary interest in
either surface or subsurface rights."7' The constitutionality of per-
mitting DER to place the responsibility for correcting a condition
causing water pollution on landowners or occupiers who did not
cause the condition was addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. DER.71 The owners of
property on which there existed a condition causing water pollu-
tion argued that a DER order, issued pursuant to section 316, was
an unconstitutional exercise of the police power. The court con-
cluded that section 316 was not an unconstitutional exercise of the
66. Act of August 23, 1965, P.L. 372. Section 2 of that act contains the General Assem-
bly's findings supporting the need for amendment.
67. Id., section 2.
68. Id., section 316.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
70. Section 316 of The Clean Streams Law, in pertinent part, states:
Whenever the department [DER] finds that pollution or a danger of pollution is re-
sulting from a condition which exists on land in the Commonwealth the department
may order the landowner or occupier to correct the condition in a manner satisfactory
to the department or it may order such owner or occupier to allow a mine operator or
other person or agency of the Commonwealth access to the land to take such action.
For the purpose of this section, "landowner" includes any person holding title to or
having a proprietary interest in either surface or subsurface rights.
If the department finds that the pollution or danger of pollution results from an act
of God in the form of sediment from land for which a complete conservation plan has
been developed by the local soil and water conservation district and the Soil Conser-
vation Service, U.S.D.A. and the plan has been fully implemented and maintained,
the landowner shall be excluded from the penalties of this act.
71. PA. STAT ANN. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Purdon Supp. 1989)(emphasis added).
72. 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 803 (1980).
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police power. In reaching its decision, the court stated: "It is also
clear that the validity of an exercise of police power over land de-
pends little upon the owner or occupier's responsibility for causing
the condition giving rise to the regulation.
'73
Justice Flaherty, in a concurring opinion, went to great lengths
to specify that the court was not establishing a strict liability stan-
dard of liability for landowners. 74 Nevertheless, both the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania 75 and the Environmental Hearing
Board (EHB)76 have subsequently held that landowners may be li-
able for conditions on their property "without fault."
DER has also issued orders to clean up contamination to a land-
owner and an occupant of contaminated property, located adjacent
to property that actually caused the contamination.77 The com-
monwealth court, in the same decision in which it upheld the or-
ders at issue in National Wood Preservers, sustained the adjacent
landowners' appeals of the DER orders. The adjacent landowner
and occupier were not liable, held the court, because they had
never "engaged in any affirmative conduct" that would indicate
"an association with or an adoption of the condition. '78 The su-
preme court dismissed, as being improvidently granted, DER's ap-
peals of the commonwealth court's order sustaining these appeals
because DER's appeals to the supreme court were untimely filed.
The supreme court therefore, did not directly address the situation
.where the landowner or occupier does not own or occupy the land
on which the condition causing the pollution was created. 79
In Western Pennsylvania Water Co. v. DER,80 the EHB held
that Western Pennsylvania Water Co. (WPW) was a landowner
within the meaning of section 316 because of its installation of a
73. 489 Pa. at 238, 414 A.2d at 45 (footnote omitted).
74. 489 Pa. at 240-43, 414 A.2d at 47-48.
75. Western Pa. Water Co. v. DER, - Pa. Commw. __, 560 A.2d 905 (1989); Bon-
zer v. DER, 69 Pa. Commw. 633, 452 A.2d 280 (1982); compare William J. Mclntire Coal Co.
v. DER, 108 Pa. Commw. 443, 452, 530 A.2d 140, 144 (1987) (" [Blefore liability will attach it
must be shown that the owner or occupier knew of the polluting condition and positively
associated with the engaging in some affirmative conduct, indicating an intent to adopt the
condition.").
76. Western Pa. Water Co. v. DER, 1988 Pa. EHB 715, 726, aff'd - Pa. Commw.
- 560 A.2d 905 (1989).
77. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. DER, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142
(1978), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, National Wood Preservers, Inc., supra.
78. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. DER, 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 443, 461, 387 A.2d
142, 151 (1978), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, National Wood Preservers, Inc., supra.
79. There appears to be no subsequent decision by either the Commonwealth or the
Supreme Court directly addressing this issue.
80. 1988 Pa. EHB 715, aff'd, - Pa. Commw. __, 560 A.2d 905 (1989).
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water line on property over which WPW had a permanent ease-
ment. The EHB determined that DER could order WPW to abate
a pollution causing condition existing on the property over which
WPW owned an easement if the means chosen by DER were not
unduly oppressive on WPW. In reaching its decision the EHB re-
lied on National Wood Preservers. The EHB ruled. that a land-
owner "includes those who have only a partial proprietary inter-
est" and an easement was such an interest."a
WPW appealed the EHB's decision to the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the EHB.8 2 The court agreed with
the EHB, holding that WPW fell within the purview of section
316, because "a permanent easement for the installation of a water
pipe line is a sufficient interest in land to bring the owner of the
easement within the scope of Section 316 of. the Clean Streams
Law."a
Relying on the landowner definition, DER has attempted to use
section 316 as the authority for orders prohibiting the removal of
equipment by a secured creditor at a strip mine site and from an
oil well. No Pennsylvania courts have addressed the propriety of
such a use of section 316, however, the issue has been addressed by
the Environmental Hearing Board.
Associates Commercial Corp. v. DER4 involved an attempt by
DER to prohibit Associates from repossessing mining equipment
located at surface mining operations operated by the Becker Coal
Company. DER had issued an order prohibiting the equipment's
removal based in part on section 316. The EHB concluded section
316 was inapplicable because Associates had not caused the nui-
sance DER was attempting to abate by ordering the equipment to
remain. The EHB noted that no one has a duty to act merely be-
cause he possesses the ability to act and prevent harm. Associates
had not previously and did not currently own the mine nor operate
it. Therefore it had no duty to use the equipment in which it had a
security interest to abate the nuisance resulting from the un-
restored mine site.8 5
81. 1988 Pa. EHB at 727.
82. Western Pa. Water Co. v. Dept. of Environmental Resources, - Pa. Commw.
- 560 A.2d 905 (1989).
83. Id. at -, 560 A.2d at 908 (footnote deleted).
84. 1979 Pa. EHB 158.
85. The EHB's reliance on the fact that Associates had not caused the nuisance should
be examined in light of the subsequent ruling in National Wood Preservers. The remainder
of the rationale of the EHB in Associates is valid.
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A reference to the propriety of using section 316 to support an
order prohibiting the removal by a secured creditor of production
equipment from an oil well was made by the EHB in Pennbank v.
DER." The EHB noted that the reach of section 316 was limited
where a party did not own or possess the land in question:
DER's Orders . . . cited certain sections of the Clean Streams Law (CSL).
• . . The CSL was not included in the stipulated issues, however, and has
not been alluded to in the briefs. As a result, our decision is not based upon
the CSL. Nonetheless, we note in passing that, since [Pennbank, the se-
cured creditor] did not own or possess the land on which the wells were
located, they would not fall within the scope of Section 316 of the CSL
87
It appears very doubtful that DER can prohibit, on the basis of
section 316, a secured creditor's removal of its collateral from a site
containing a condition causing or capable of causing pollution.
Likewise, the EHB has ruled against DER's position that section
316 applies to secured creditors. It is unlikely that DER will give
up its contrary position. As the case law indicates, once the credi-
tor becomes an owner of the site, DER's position becomes stronger.
IV. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT
Pennsylvania enacted the Solid Waste Management Act
(SWMA)88 in 1980 as a means of managing solid and hazardous
wastes from cradle to grave. 9 SWMA provided a means by which
DER could regulate the disposal of municipal, residual, and haz-
ardous wastes. The statute established a permit and enforcement
system that required the operators of most waste facilities to ob-
tain permits or face stiff penalties. In addition, the generation,
transportation, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous
wastes were strictly regulated.s0 Violations of SWMA may result in
a response from DER ranging from enforcement orders to civil
fines to criminal penalties.9 1 SWMA is the primary vehicle utilized
86. No. 88-281-M (Pa. EHB Feb. 15, 1989), 1989 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 39.
87. Id. at 24 n. 2 (emphasis added).
88. Act of July 7, 1980, P.L. 380, PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 35, §§ 6018.101-6018.1003 (Purdon
Supp. 1989).
89. See Katcher, Hazardous Waste Management Under Act 97, 86 DICK. L, REv, 665
(1982).
90. The hazardous waste provisions of SWMA paralleled the provisions of the federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6018.601-6018.614 (Purdon Supp. 1989). See e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986); Waste Conversion,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commw. -, 568 A.2d 738 (1990).
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by DER for pursuing those persons who have unlawfully disposed
of waste substances.
Section 501 of SWMA makes it unlawful for "any person. . .to
use, or continue to use, their land or the land of any other person
or municipality as a solid waste processing, storage, treatment or
disposal area without first obtaining a permit from the department
[DER] .. ."92 Provisions regarding municipal waste and residual
waste are similar to the aforementioned provision. The act defines
"person" very broadly to include virtually any entity and "any
other legal entity whatsoever which is recognized by law as the
subject of rights and duties." 93 No provisions mention financial in-
stitutions or creditors. Thus, while the definition of person is
broad, the operative language of SWMA appears sufficiently nar-
row to exclude creditors from liability except in those instances
when they would be exposed to liability as a result of traditional
grounds for lender liability.
9 4
V. HAZARDOUS SITES CLEANUP ACT
On October 18, 1988, the Pennsylvania General Assembly en-
acted the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act"' (HSCA or Pennsylvania
Superfund). The General Assembly found HSCA to be necessary
to permit the Commonwealth to take full advantage of opportuni-
ties for state participation in the clean up of hazardous waste sites
identified under CERCLAe ("Superfund sites") and to enable ac-
tion to be taken at hazardous sites that are not placed by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the list
of sites identified as priority sites for cleanup under CERCLA
9 7
HSCA establishes a number of mechanisms whereby DER, or mu-
nicipalities, may recover from persons deemed responsible the
costs of abating public nuisances, costs incurred for responding to
releases of hazardous substances, costs related to damages to natu-
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6018.501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.103 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
94. The EHB has held, relying on dicta in the commonwealth court opinion in Dept.
of Environmental Resources v. O'Hara Sanitation Co., - Pa. Commw. -, 562 A.2d 973
(1989), that SWMA does not authorize DER to hold a person responsible for pollution on
his property solely on the basis of ownership. Blumenthal v. Dept. of Environmental Re-
sources, No. 89-230-F (Pa. EHB March 6, 1990).
95. Act of October 18, 1988, P.L. 756, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.101-6020.1305
(Purdon Supp. 1989).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982).
97. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.102 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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ral resources, and civil penalties." No Pennsylvania court has
ruled on whether HSCA provides a private cause of action for
damages; however, at least one federal court has ruled that HSCA
does not provide a private cause of action for damages.9
HSCA establishes three classes of so-called "responsible per-
sons" that are liable for cleaning up hazardous waste sites: site
owners or operators; generators of the hazardous substances; and,
transporters of the hazardous substances.100 As with many of the
provisions of HSCA, this provision closely resembles CERCLA.' 0 '
As was pointed out in Section II of this article, creditors have been
found to be responsible parties and liable under CERCLA, as own-
ers or operators, for cleanup costs at hazardous waste sites.
As a result of the adverse rulings under CERCLA, financial in-
stitutions concluded that HSCA, as it was first proposed as a bill
in the General Assembly,0 2 would have an adverse impact on the
lending market in this state. Members of the General Assembly
were convinced that a special exception for lending institutions
from the definition of responsible person should be incorporated
into the act, and HSCA as enacted contains such an exception.1
0 3
Nevertheless, a review and analysis of this new Pennsylvania envi-
ronmental law discloses areas of potential concern for creditors, in-
cluding possible liability as a responsible person.
A. Establishment of the Environmental Lien
HSCA establishes a lien which may attach upon certain property
of responsible persons, as described below.'04 (The lien is referred
to herein as the "environmental lien.") The lien is not a "super-
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
99. Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., No. 88-1764 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1990), 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1568. The district court had previously permitted the plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint to include a HSCA claim and invited a motion to dismiss. Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc.,
725 F. Supp. 258, 267 (1989).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.701(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). Because of the numerous similarities between
HSCA and CERCLA the Pennsylvania courts will likely turn to interpretations of the fed-
eral law when seeking precedent or other guidance. Litigants should note, however, that
corresponding provisions are not identical and significant differences exist.
102. See House Bill 1852, Printer's No. 2321, sections 103 and 701(b). The original bill
contained, in its definition of "owner or operator," the same "security interest exemption"
found in CERCLA. See Section 103 of HB 1852, Printer's No. 2321 at 10.
103. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.103 and 6020.701(b)(1)(D) (Purdon Supp.
1989). As is described in the text following this footnote, the exemption finally adopted by
the General Assembly is far broader then that contained in CERCLA.
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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lien."1 5 Rather, the lien "has priority from the day of the filing of
the notice of the lien over all subsequent claims and liens against
the property."'01 6 The lien is established as a result of a judgment
against a "responsible person." 0 7 Such a judgment results from an
award of response costs, assessment of damages to natural re-
sources, or assessment of civil penalties.'08
The award of response costs appears to be an award pursuant to
a judgment in a court of common pleas or the EHB. 'o9 However,
the assessment of damages to natural resources and the assessment
of civil penalties are administrative assessments."0 The statute is
unclear as to whether the assessment must be final pursuant to
Pennsylvania administrative law in order for the lien to be
perfected.
For the lien to be established against a responsible person's real
or personal property, HSCA requires DER to send a notice of the
lien,, setting forth the amount of the judgment, to the prothonotary
of the county in which the responsible person has real or personal
property."' The prothonotary is required to enter upon the civil
judgment or "order docket" the name and address of the responsi-
ble person and the amount of the lien as set forth in the notice of
lien." 2 Once the prothonotary has entered the lien, "the lien shall
attach to the revenue and all real and personal property of the re-
sponsible person, whether or not the responsible person is insol-
105. A superlien is a lien that grants the state a lien on property to ensure repayment
of funds utilized by a state for environmental cleanup. The superlien usually subordinates
previously filed liens, including mortgage liens. Gieser, supra note 8, at 690. The following
states have environmental superlien statutes: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-516 (1987);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1989); Massachusetts, MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58.10-
23.11f (West Supp. 1989); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10b (Supp. 1989);
and, Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209 (1987).
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
108. Id.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.507(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
110. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.507(d), 6020.1104(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). The
assessment of natural resources damages is implied by the act. While HSCA describes the
effect of a natural resources damage assessment, it does not describe the manner by which
such an assessment will be made. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.507(d) (Purdon Supp.
1989). DER will, no doubt, argue that the assessment takes place when it issues an assess-
ment letter. A responsible party (or the responsible party's creditors) will argue that the
assessment does not take place until the Court of Common Pleas or EHB has issued its final
ruling.




vent."'113 Thus, in searching titles it will now be necessary to search
both the civil judgment and order dockets to determine whether an
environmental lien has attached.
HSCA also establishes a central registry of all environmental
liens. The Commonwealth, presumably DER, is required to file a
notice of lien with the Department of State in addition to the fil-
ings with a prothonotary. 1 4 While the statute does not create any
penalty for failure to register the lien with the Department of
State, it would be prudent to check with the Department of State
for the existence of an environmental lien." 5
B. "Responsible Persons" and Exceptions Applicable to Finan-
cial Institutions
Under HSCA, the term "responsible person" is defined in a
manner that attempts to exempt financial institutions:
"Responsible person." A person responsible for the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance as described in Section 701 [Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 35, § 6020.701]. In no case shall a financial institution or its affiliate or a
corporate instrumentality of the Federal Government be deemed to be a
responsible person or to be jointly or contingently liable for the actions of a
responsible person by virtue or supervision of, or other involvement with,
the finances and operations of a responsible person in connection with a
loan, obligation or other service provided." 6
As previously noted, HSCA further defines "responsible person" to
include three classes.11 7 The first is the owner or operator of the
site, either at the time of the disposal, prior to the release of the
hazardous substance, or during the release or threatened release.
The second is the generator of a hazardous substance. The third is
the transporter of the hazardous substance.
"Owner or operator" is defined in a manner that provides a
broad security interest and general exemption for financial institu-
tions, going well beyond the security interest exemption found in
CERCLA:
113. Id.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.509(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
115. In light of HSCA's close relationship to CERCLA, a recent order by Judge Mc-
Cune of the Western District of Pennsylvania is of interest. On September 19, 1989, Judge
McCune ordered a property lien, imposed pursuant to CERCLA, be removed because the
federal government had not paid to clean up the site. Superfund Lien Removed by Court,
Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter, Oct. 30, 1989 at 11.
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.103 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.701(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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A person who owns or operates or has owned or operated a site, or otherwise
controlled activities at a site. The term does not include a person who, with-
out participating in the management of a site, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest in the site nor a unit of State or local
government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through
bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment or other circumstances in which
the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sov-
ereign. The term also shall not include a financial institution, an affiliate of
such financial institution, a parent of a financial institution, nor a corporate
instrumentality of the Federal Government, which acquired the site by fore-
closure or by deed in lieu of foreclosure as a result of the enforcement of a
mortgage or security interest held by such financial institution, parent of
such financial institution, affiliate of such financial institution or a corporate
instrumentality of the Federal Government before it had knowledge that
the site was included on the National Priority List or corresponding State
list and did not manage or control activities at the site which contributed to
the release or the threatened release of a hazardous substance. For the pur-
poses of this subsection, the term 'management' shall not include participa-
tion in or supervising the finances or fiscal operations of a responsible per-
son or an owner or operator in connection with a loan to, services provided
for or fiscal obligation of that responsible person or owner or operator or
actions taken to protect or preserve the value of the site or operations con-
ducted on the site. This exclusion does not apply to a political subdivision
which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from the site." '
It is clear that the drafters attempted to counter the adverse opin-
ions under CERCLA in Mirabile19 and Maryland Bank & Trust'2
by the use of the sweeping language contained in the definition of
owner or operator. The definition, however, also makes it clear that
the creditor's protection still hinges on his knowledge and the de-
gree of management he has exerted.
HSCA contains a significant exemption for financial institutions,
which become owners as a result of foreclosure, in the list of excep-
tions to liability for owners of real property.' The exception in
which the "financial institution exemption" is included states:
An owner of real property is not responsible for the release of threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a site in or on the property when the
owner demonstrates to the department that all of the following are true:
(i) The real property on which the site concerned is located was acquired by
the owner after the disposal or placement of a hazardous substance on, in or
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.103 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
119. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). See supra, note 30 and
accompanying text.
120. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
121. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 35, § 6020.701(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1989). This exemption is




(ii) The owner has exercised due care with respect to the hazardous sub-
stances concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such haz-
ardous substances, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances.
(iii) The owner took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.
(iv) The owner obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance at the site when the owner owned the real
property, and the owner did not subsequently transfer ownership of the
property to another person without disclosing such knowledge.
(v) The owner has not, by act or omission, caused or contributed to the
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the subject
of the response action relating to the site.
(vi) The owner meets one of these requirements:
(A) At the time the owner acquired the site, the owner did not know, and
had no reason to know, that a hazardous substance which is the subject of
the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the site. For
purposes of this subparagraph, the owner must have undertaken, at the
time of acquisition, all appropriate inquires into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice
in an effort to minimize liability. The department shall take into account
specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the owner, the relation-
ship of the purchase price to the Value of the property if uncontaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the prop-
erty, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at
the property and the ability to detect the contamination by appropriate
inspection.
(B) The owner is a government entity which acquired the site by escheat,
through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition or through the exer-
cise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(C) The owner acquired the site by inheritance or bequest.
(D) The owner is a financial institution or an affiliate of a financial insti-
tution or a corporate instrumentality of the Federal Government which
acquired the site by foreclosure or by acceptance of a deed in lieu of
foreclosure.
(vii) The only basis of liability for the landowner is ownership of the land.122
To qualify for the "financial institution exemption" all of the
preconditions of the exception must be met. It is not sufficient that
a lender has acquired a property by foreclosure if, for example, the
lender has failed to take precautions against the foreseeable acts or
omissions of a third party or has failed to meet one of the other
provisions of the exemption.
The exemption calls for due diligence on the part of creditors,
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.701(b)(1)(Purdon Supp. 1989) (emphasis added)
(the emphasized language is the "financial institution exemption").
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although not to the extent of that required for other persons who
unknowingly acquired contaminated property. In addition, the ex-
ception applies to owners of real property and not to operators of
real property. Thus, an argument could be made that a bank, fore-
closing on real property and allowing operations to continue once it
has taken title, would be an operator of a facility and thus not able
to qualify for the exception.
Under HSCA, once a bank or other lender has foreclosed on a
mortgage and has taken possession of property, it may avail itself
of HSCA's protection from liability as an "owner" of a hazardous
waste site. This protection was unavailable to the banks described
in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co."' and Guidice v.
BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co."" An open question is whether
DER or other interested parties would attempt to find some other
basis of liability for a foreclosing creditor. It would not be surpris-
ing to see DER or a plaintiff argue that a lender is a responsible
person despite the statutory protection for creditors.
C. Considerations for financial institutions
Regardless of the protection provided by HSCA, a lender may
still be liable under the federal CERCLA as a result of its owner-
ship of contaminated property as CERCLA does not contain a sim-
ilar financial institution exemption.' 2" Without further protection
from Congress, HSCA's financial institution exemption may be a
hollow victory for creditors. Worse yet, it could lull creditors into a
false sense of security.
Lenders must be concerned about the lien provisions of HSCA.
While the most prudent manner of proceeding would be to conduct
a title search prior to entering into a secured transaction with a
borrower to determine if an environmental lien has been filed,
many types of loan arrangements require the payment of money by
the lender to the borrower over a period of time (e.g., purchase
money security interest). In such instances, the lender will be faced
with the prospect that loans made after the initial loan may be
displaced by an environmental lien.
123. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
124. 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
125. A bill has been introduced in Congress (H.R. 2085) to redefine "owner or opera-
tor" under CERCLA to exclude commercial lending institutions that acquire ownership or
control of a property to realize on a security interest. 135 Cong. Rec. E1325-26 (daily ed.
April 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. LaFalce); See Update on Lender Liability Under
Superfund, Secured Lending Alert, January 1990, at 2, 3.
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HSCA seems to protect lenders from being deemed "operators"
under that statute as a result of working with a borrower rather
than foreclosing on the loan. Likewise, the exemption from the def-
inition of owner seems to protect those financial institutions that
have foreclosed on a mortgage. Neither protection is absolute. The
lack of absolute protection in HSCA creates problems for creditors.
Also, while financial institutions have some protection in the stat-
ute in the exception to the definition of "owner" where the creditor
has foreclosed, the creditor must still satisfy six additional require-
ments to be entitled to this exemption from liability. In addition,
there is no exception for a bank that becomes an operator of a
hazardous waste site after the foreclosure on the loan.
VI. STORAGE TANK AND SPILL PREVENTION ACT
On July 6, 1989, the General Assembly enacted the Storage
Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Storage Tank Act).' s" The Storage
Tank Act regulates both aboveground and underground storage
tanks. Consequently, it goes beyond similar provisions found in the
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 11 7 that
are limited to underground storage tanks (USTs). 2 I The Storage
Tank Act contains requirements for the design, construction, oper-
ation, permitting and registration of most tanks, as well as require-
ments for insuring the financial responsibility of tank owners.129 In
addition, the Storage Tank Act contains provisions requiring plans
for spill prevention response that must be prepared and submitted
by the owners and operators of tanks.3 0 Needless to say, as with
virtually all environmental laws, the act contains enforcement pro-
visions containing civil and criminal provisions.'
The terms "owner" and "operator" are used extensively
throughout in the Storage Tank Act. The term "owner" is defined
expansively and includes "any person who owns or has an owner-
ship interest in a storage tank used for the storage, containment,
use or dispensing of regulated substances."' 32 "Operator" is de-
126. Act of July 6, 1989, P.L. - (No.1989-32), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6021.101 -
6021.2104, (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982).
128. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991 - 6991i (1982).
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6021.301 - 6021.506 (Pa. Legis Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6021.901 - 6021.904 (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6021.1301 - 6021.1315 (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon
1989).
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.103 (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
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fined as "[a]ny person who manages, supervises, alters, controls or
has responsibility for the operation of a storage tank." '3 Owners
are required to register aboveground"3 and underground tanks.
1 3 5
Owners and operators are also required to meet the financial re-
sponsibility requirements. 36 A special requirement of the Storage
Tank Act is that it makes guarantors of financial responsibility di-
rectly liable for actions against insolvent or bankrupt owners or
operators.137 Owners are also required to provide spill prevention
response plans, 138 and owners and operators are required to give
notice of spills'3 9 and intention to construct new tanks.1
4 0
The term "person" is defined expansively in a manner that is
similar to the definition contained in SWMA.14 "Persons" may not
"install, construct, erect, modify, operate or remove from service"
all or part of an aboveground" 2 or underground 14 3 tank unless au-
thorized by DER's regulations or without a permit issued by DER.
Persons may be liable for all violations of the act and are subject
to all enforcement provisions enumerated in the act.'"
4
"Landowners" and "occupiers" are also mentioned in the Stor-
age Tank Act. Neither landowner nor occupier is defined in the
act. The Storage Tank Act allows DER to order an "owner, opera-
tor, landowner or occupier" to take corrective action where a re-
lease or threat of a release is occurring from a tank." 5 Where such
133. Id.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.303(a) (Pa Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.503(a) (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.35, § 6021.701 (Pa. Legis Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.701(c) (Pa. Legis Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.901 (Pa. Legis Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.904 (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.35, § 6021.1101(a) (Pa. Legis Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
141. "Person" is defined as:
Any individual, partnership, corporation, association, joint venture, consortium, insti-
tution, trust, firm, joint-stock company, cooperative enterprise, municipality, munici-
pal authority, Federal Government or agency, Commonwealth department, agency,
board, commission or authority, or any other legal entity whatsoever which is recog-
nized by law as the subject of rights and duties. In any provisions of this act prescrib-
ing a fine, imprisonment or penalty, or any combination of the foregoing, the term
'person' shall include the officers and directors of any corporation or other legal entity
having officers and directors."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.103 (Pa. Legis Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.304 (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.504 (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
144. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6021.1304 (public nuisances), 6021.1306 (criminal
penalties), 6021.1307 (civil penalties) and 6021.1309 (enforcement orders) (Pa. Legis Serv.
133, Purdon 1989).
145. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.1302(a) (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
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a person fails to take action, DER may take the action and assess
the costs incurred in responding to the release or threat of a re-
lease against the responsible "person." 4"
The definitions of owner and operator are more expansive than
those found in other Pennsylvania environmental laws. The term
"person" is also expansively defined. The terms landowner and oc-
cupier appear to have been recycled from section 316 of The Clean
Streams Law. It is likely that DER will argue that these terms
should be construed in a manner that includes lender liability. It
should be noted that there is no "security interest exemption" con-
tained in the Storage Tank Act, so the protection contained in
HSCA and CERCLA is not available to secured creditors.1
4 7
VII. SURFACE MINING CONSERVATION AND RECLAMATION ACT AND
COAL REFUSE DISPOSAL AND CONTROL ACT
For many years, Pennsylvania has regulated the operation of
surface mines 4 8 and deep mines located in the Commonwealth.
Surface mining first came under regulation with the passage of the
Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act (Bituminous
Act) in 19451"1 and the Anthracite Strip Mining and Conservation
Act (Anthracite Act) in 1947.150 The reclamation requirements for
surface mining operations under these acts were not stringent.'
In 1971, the Anthracite Act was repealed, and the Bituminous Act
was amended and renamed the Surface Mining Conservation and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA) and made applicable to all surface
mining, anthracite, bituminous, and non-coal. 52 The amendments
included provisions requiring mine operators to backfill sites to
their pre-mining contours, to reestablish permanent vegetation on
reclaimed sites and to prevent soil erosion.' 53
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6021.1302(b) (Pa. Legis. Serv. 133, Purdon 1989).
147. The analysis in prior sections of this article with respect to these terms applies
with equal force under the Storage Tank Act and will not be repeated here. It should go
without saying that creditors should take care to avoid becoming owners, operators, persons,
landowners or occupiers under the Storage Tank Act.
148. For a detailed description of the regulation of surface mining in Pennsylvania, see
Burcat & Geary, Surface Mining Regulation in Pennsylvania, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1984).
149. Act of May 31, 1945, P.L. 1198.
150. Act of June 27, 1947, P.L. 1095.
151. For example, backfilling was required to a height of only 3 feet above the exposed
coal seam, at the base of the remaining highwall. Section 10 of the Act of May 31, 1945.
Bond requirements were also minimal, requiring only $200 per acre. Section 4 of the Act of
May 31, 1945.
152. Act of November 30, 1971, P.L. 147.
153. Sections 4(b)(5) and (7) of the Act of November 30, 1971, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §
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In 1966, the General Assembly enacted The Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act"' to protect surface struc-
tures and the land supporting them from damage likely to occur as
a result of deep mine subsidences. 5 As discussed in Section III of
this article, runoff and discharges from coal mines were originally
exempted from the requirements of The Clean Streams Law and
did not become fully regulated until amendments to that law in
1965. The current provisions of the SMCRA, 56 and the Coal Re-
fuse Disposal and Control Act (CRDCA), 57 are directed to opera-
tors of surface mine sites and coal refuse disposal sites.1
58
DER has attempted to use SMCRA and CRDCA, in particular
the regulations promulgated pursuant to them, to support orders
prohibiting bankruptcy trustees and secured creditors from remov-
ing equipment needed for reclamation from a mining site. The spe-
cific regulation utilized prohibited the removal of backfilling equip-
ment from a surface mine site until reclamation was complete. 59 It
also required the equipment to be kept "operable, in use, and ca-
pable of meeting the requirements of the reclamation plan
throughout the life of the mining operation."' 160 This regulation has
been relied on by DER to issue orders prohibiting creditors from
repossessing their collateral and requiring creditors to reclaim
abandoned strip mines. A brief review of the decisions addressing
DER's use of this regulation will show that SMCRA and CRDCA
are unlikely vehicles for the imposition of liability on secured
creditors.
In Associates Commercial Corp. v. DER, 6' the EHB ruled that
1396.4(2)(G) and (E) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
154. Act of April 27, 1966, P.L. 31, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-
1406.21 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
155. Id., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.3 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Pennsylvania regulated
deep mines and their surface effects for many years prior to the Act. See Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
156. Act of May 31, 1945, P.L. 1198, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-
1396.31 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
157. Act of September 24, 1968, P.L. 1040, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§
30.51-30.66 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
158. Surface mining of minerals other than coal are now controlled by the Noncoal
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1093, as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 3301-3326 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
159. 25 PA. CODE §77.92(f)(2). This section was rescinded by 12 Pa. Bull. 2382 (effec-
tive July 31, 1982). The provisions of section 77.92(f)(2) were virtually identical to those
that now appear at 25 PA. CODE §87.141(d).
160. Id.
161. 1979 Pa. EHB 158.
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DER lacked the authority to prevent the secured creditor from re-
possessing mining equipment. In reaching this result, the EHB
noted that DER's use of this regulation to prohibit the reposses-
sion of mining equipment would "impose two irreconcilable duties"
upon the secured creditor Associates: Associates would have no
control over the equipment until the equipment was repossessed
and to repossess the equipment would require Associates to re-
move the equipment from the site.16 The EHB also noted that
DER's interpretation would place a "duty upon an innocent third
person to rectify a condition that he had no part in creating" and
permit the operator to use the equipment for his own purposes
without any assurance that Associates would receive any value.
16 3
The EHB also supported its determination by reference to the
principles of statutory construction. The regulation in effect at
that time was entitled: "Requirements Accompanying Permits Au-
thorizing The Operation of Surface Coal Mines." It set forth the
requirements undertaken by operators of coal mine sites when
they obtained permits. The EHB noted that it was the operator
who violated these requirements when his equipment was repos-
sessed, not the secured creditor.1 64 The EHB pointed out that the
SMCRA provided many remedies against the operator of a mine
who failed to restore mined areas and also provided a mechanism
for obtaining the funds for reclamation when the operator did not
do the work."6 5
In Matter of Zacherl Coal Co.,166 the federal district court ad-
dressed DER's appeal of the bankruptcy court's dismissal of DER
complaints against the trustees and secured creditors of two coal
companies in chapter 7 bankruptcy. DER sought to have the court
order the trustees to restore the strip mining sites operated by the
companies and to direct that no equipment necessary for the recla-
mation be removed from the sites. DER based its requests, in part,
on a regulation.6 7 The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaints.
DER appealed.
The district court first noted that the appeals were moot because
162. Id. at 161.
163. Id. at 162.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 9 Bankr. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
167. 25 PA. CODE §77.92(f)(2). This regulation was rescinded by 12 Pa. Bull. 2382 (ef-




DER had not attempted to have the bankruptcy proceedings
stayed and the equipment had been removed from the site, sold
and the proceeds distributed. DER argued that because the issue
was one of first impression, the court should address it anyway.
The court noted that the issue was not one of first impression and
referenced In re Reddale Coal Co., Inc.16 8 The court noted that
execution under the bond, required of coal operators under The
Clean Streams Law, was the proper course for DER to take to en-
sure restoration of the mine sites. The court concluded that the
bond execution was an adequate remedy for violations alleged in
the complaint, making it unnecessary to impose the obligation on
the trustee. The court also noted that such a requirement could
"frustrate" the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. 6 9
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. S.E. Barnhart & Sons10 dealt with an
attempt to prohibit repossession of equipment at a strip mining
site. Ford Motor Credit Co. brought suit to replevy a wheel loader
used in stripping coal at a strip mine site. The district court held
that Pennsylvania regulation, 25 Pa. Code §77.92(f)(2), prohibited
Ford from removing the equipment until the reclamation work was
completed. Ford appealed. The Third Circuit recognized that
Pennsylvania state courts had yet to address the issue but noted
the decisions in Associates, Reddale, and Zacherl. The Third Cir-
cuit noted that SMCRA does not refer to financial institutions.
The court doubted that the General Assembly "ever intended the
Department to issue regulations impairing the security interest of
creditors created by the legislature in the Uniform Commercial
Code. '17' The court agreed with the EHB decision in Associates
that the regulation does not apply to creditors whose only connec-
tion with the equipment is a security interest.
As did the EHB in Associates, the Third Circuit applied the
168. The district court notes in its opinion that the memorandum decision and order
in the Reddale case were subsequently vacated at the request of the parties. The court,
nevertheless, adopted the Reddale rationale. 9 Bankr. at 956 n.1.
169. But cf., In the Matter of Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984),
aff'd sub nor. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). In Quanta, the
Third Circuit held that a trustee could not abandon real estate owned by the bankrupt
company where the property was extensively contaminated with PCBs. The court balanced
the purpose of the bankruptcy provision permitting abandonment with the purpose of state
environmental laws and concluded that the environmental concerns outweighed the protec-
tion of the bankruptcy estate. New York was the state challenging the abandonment, how-
ever, the court addressed the issue generically without referencing any specific environmen-
tal law.
170. 664 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1981).
171. Id. at 381-82.
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principles of statutory construction, concluding that the title of the
subchapter containing the regulation, "Requirements Accompany-
ing Permits Authorizing the Operation of Surface Coal Mines,"
shows that the regulation is directed to those required to secure
permits-operators. The court was careful to note that its decision
was limited to a "party whose only contact with the strip mine
operator and the mining operation is its security interest in a piece
of mining equipment.'
72
Because no Pennsylvania court has addressed DER's attempted
use of SMCRA and CRDCA and the regulations promulgated
thereto to prevent repossession of mining equipment and to order
secured creditors to perform reclamation, it should be expected
that DER will continue to make such attempted use of the acts
and regulations. In addition, if a secured creditor, rather than re-
possessing equipment, opted to become involved in the mining op-
eration itself, the creditor could find itself subject to the permit-
ting requirements.
VIII. OIL AND GAS ACT
Unlike The Clean Streams Law, HSCA, SWMA, the Storage
Tank Act, SMCRA, and CRDCA, the initial laws establishing regu-
lation of oil and gas mining were motivated by a desire to conserve
oil and gas and not a desire to protect the environment. 171 How-
ever, the impact of abandoned, or non-operating, mines upon water
was not ignored. In 1891, Pennsylvania enacted legislation address-
ing the plugging of oil wells.174 This legislation included a section
making it the "duty of the person or persons interested in such
[abandoned or non-operating well] to plug the same" in order to
prevent water that could injure or pollute "any spring, water well
or stream" from escaping.1 75 This section, and the section estab-
lishing penalties for its violation, appear still to be in effect, al-
though they do not appear to ever have been utilized.1
76
The Oil and Gas Act, 77 enacted in 1984, specifically states that
172. Id. at 382.
173. See J. Kaput and J. Carroll, Pooling and Unitization in Pennsylvania: An Over-
view, in Mineral Resource Development Law 283, 283, 292-295 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute
1984).
174. Acts of May 6 and 26, 1891, P.L. 41 and 122.
175. Section 1 of the Act of May 26, 1891.
176. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1, 2, and 3 (Purdon 1964).
177. Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§
601.101-601.605 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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one of its purposes is to "[p]rotect the natural resources, environ-
mental rights and values secured by the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.'1 78 Provisions of this act with potential impact on secured
creditors are discussed below.
A. General Liability of Creditors
DER has attempted to prevent a secured lender from repossess-
ing and removing oil well production equipment and to order the
secured lender to plug an abandoned oil well in accordance with
section 210 of the Oil and Gas Act.179 The EHB rejected this at-
tempt in Pennbank v. DER. °80
Section 210(a) of the Oil and Gas Act states, in pertinent part:
Upon abandoning any well, the owner or operator thereof shall plug the well
in a manner prescribed by regulation of the department in order to stop any
vertical flow of fluids or gas within the well bore unless the department has
granted inactive status for such well pursuant to section 204.8"
DER argued that a secured lender, because of the control rights it
had under the loan documents, should be considered an "owner"
within the meaning of section 210(a). The EHB concluded that
"control" of the production equipment did not constitute the own-
ership required by section 210(a)-what was required was control
of the well. The secured creditor would not fall within the ambit of
section 210(a) until "affirmative steps to enter into possession and
control of the wells" had been taken. Therefore, even where the
secured creditor had the right to take control of the wells, it could
not be ordered to plug the wells until it had taken affirmative steps
to exercise control.
In its analysis, the EHB discussed other environmental statutes
and the instances in which secured creditors had been held to have
and not have liability. The EHB also briefly reviewed the legal re-
sponsibility of mortgagees and other secured creditors. In reaching
its decision, the EHB was careful to note that there might be cir-
cumstances in which a secured creditor could be held responsible
178. Id., §601.102(4).
179. Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §
601.210 Purdon Supp. 1989).
180. No. 88-281-M (Pa. EHB Feb. 15, 1989), 1989 Pa. Ervirn. LEXIS 39. EHB mem-
ber Robert D. Myers' thoughtful, though short, opinion for the EHB in Pennbank is the
only opinion that has seriously attempted to analyze the legal rights and obligations of cred-
itors separate and apart from obligations arising from environmental law requirements. See
Id., slip op. at 8-18.




Section 207 of the Oil and Gas Act1"2 contains a provision requir-
ing "[e]ach oil or gas well owner or operator" to "restore the land
surface within the area disturbed in siting, drilling, completing and
producing the well." On the basis of Pennbank, secured creditors
should not be classified as owners as long as they have not exer-
cised any right they might have to take control of the well.
B. Oil and Gas Act Superlien
Section 210(e) of the Oil and Gas Act,183 has a potential impact
on secured lenders. When a well is abandoned without plugging,
section 210(e) permits DER to enter onto the premises, plug the
well, obtain a superlien1 84 on any production equipment left on the
site, and sell the equipment to recover the cost of plugging. With
respect to this lien on equipment for plugging costs, the section
210(e) states: "Said costs of plugging shall have priority over all
liens on said equipment, casing and pipe, and said sale shall be
free and clear of any such liens to the extent the costs of plugging
exceed the sale price." The seizure and sale of equipment author-
ized by this section has been upheld against a due process
challenge. 185
Any creditor having a security interest in the production equip-
ment left at an abandoned well could very well lose its security if
DER elects to utilize this provision. It seems likely that DER will
do just that if it continues to be unsuccessful in its attempts to
utilize section 210(a) to order the secured creditor to plug the well.
Secured creditors should not have any liability under the Oil and
Gas Act for their debtors' failure to comply with its provisions so
long as they do not exercise any right of control. However, they
face a very real possibility of losing any collateral, consisting of
production equipment, left at the site if the debtor fails to plug an
abandoned well in conformity with the requirements of the Oil and
Gas Act.
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 601.207 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
183. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 601.210(e) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
184. See supra note 105.
185. Pennsylvania Independent Petroleum Producers v. DER, 106 Pa. Commw. 72,
525 A.2d 829 (1987), aff'd, 520 Pa. 59, 550 A.2d 195 (1988), cert. denied, - U.S. __, 109




Under Pennsylvania law secured creditors may be found liable
for environmentally adverse conditions existing at their debtor's
property. DER's willingness to assert environmental lender liabil-
ity against creditors should give creditors pause for concern when
making loans, assisting their debtors, or, especially, foreclosing on
security interests on environmentally contaminated properties. As
this article has demonstrated, the potential for liability exists
under more than simply the hazardous waste laws.186 The greatest
areas of concern for creditors are under HSCA, the Storage Tank
Act, and Section 316 of The Clean Streams Law.187 Financial insti-
tutions must take care not to be lulled into a false sense of security
because of the favorable language found in HSCA. Surely DER, or
other potentially responsible parties, will attempt to bypass HSCA
and file against creditors under the provisions of CERCLA that do
not favor financial institutions.
The best defense available to creditors is a strong offense. Credi-
tors should not become trapped in environmental lender liability
through inadequate planning or poor loan management. Lenders
may wish to consider requiring environmental audits before mak-
ing larger loans to customers that have facilities using industrial
processes or are purchasing commercial and industrial property. 88
Likewise, lenders should consider obtaining environmental audits
prior to assisting these debtors when they are having difficulty re-
paying their loans and prior to foreclosing on these properties. In-
demnification agreements, escrowing of funds, and representations
and warranties to protect against environmental liability should
become standard forms for all commercial creditors. Those forward
thinking creditors that seize the initiative in this area will be the
ones that succeed in avoiding this liability.
186. The reader should understand, by now, that such potential liability exists under a
plethora of federal environmental laws, as well.
187. Section 316 of The Clean Streams Law is the provision which provides for liabil-
ity "without fault" of the landowner or occupier. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Purdon
Supp. 1989).
188. A brief survey of the implications of Pennsylvania and federal law on buying and
selling a business may be found in C. Cicconi, C. Kegel, Jr., M. Lieber, S. Pennwell & L.
Reznick, Buying & Selling a Business 102-20 (1988).
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